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.Inthe meantime, American long-range interests in Eurasia would be better served by abandoning existing U.S.objections to closer Turkish-Iranian economic cooperation, especially in the construction of new pipelines, andalso to the construction of other links between Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan.Long-term Americanparticipation in the financing of such projects would in fact also beJn the American interest.22.It is appropriate to quote here the wise advice offered by my colleague at CSIS, Anthony H.Cordesman (inhis paper on "The American Threat to the United States," February 1997, p.16, delivered as a speech to theArmy War College), who has warned against the American propensity to demonize issues and even nations.Ashe put it: "Iran, Iraq, and Libya are cases where the U.S.has taken hostile regimes that pose real, but limitedthreats and 'de-monized' them without developing any workable mid- to long-term end game for its strategy.U.S.planners cannot hope to totally isolate these states, and it makes no sense to treat them as if they wereidentical 'rogue' or 'terrorist' states.The U.S.lives in a morally gray world and cannot succeed by trying tomake il black and white."India's potential role needs also to be highlighted, although it is currently a relatively passive player on theEurasian scene.India is contained geopolitically by the Chinese-Pakistani coalition, while a weak Russia cannotoffer it the political support once provided by the Soviet Union.However, the survival of its democracy is ofimportance in that it refutes better than volumes of academic debate the notion that human rights anddemocracy are purely a parochial Western manifestation.India proves that antidemocratic "Asian values,"propagated by spokesmen from Singapore to China, are simply antidemocratic but not necessarily characteristicof Asia.India's failure, by the same token, would be a blow to the prospects for democracy and would removefrom the scene a power that contributes to greater balance on the Asian scene, especially given China's rise togeopolitical preeminence.It follows that a progressive engagement of India in discussions pertaining toregional stability, especially regarding the future of Central Asia, is becoming timely, not to mention thepromotion of more directly bilateral connections between American and Indian defense communities.Geopolitical pluralism in Eurasia as a whole will neither be attainable nor stable without a deepeningstrategic understanding between America and China.It follows that a policy of engaging China in a seriousstrategic dialogue, eventually perhaps in a three-way effort that involves Japan as well, is the necessary firststep in enhancing China's interest in an accommodation with America that reflects the several geopoliticalinterests (especially in Northeast Asia and in Central Asia) the two countries in fact share in common.It alsobehooves America to eliminate any uncertainties regarding America's own commitment to the one-Chinapolicy, lest the Taiwan issue fester and worsen, especially after China's absorption of Hong Kong.By the sametoken, it is in China's own interest to make that absorption a successful demonstration of the principle that evena Greater China can tolerate and safeguard increased diversity in its internal political arrangements.While as argued earlier in chapters 4 and 6 any would-be Chinese-Russian-Iranian coalition againstAmerica is unlikely to jell beyond some occasional tactical posturing, it is important for the United Stales todeal with China in a fashion that floes not drive Beijing in that direction.In any such "antihegemonic" alliance,China would be the linchpin.It would be the strongest, the most dynamic, and thus the leading component.Such a coalition could only emerge around a disaffected, frustrated, and hostile China.Neither Russia nor Iranhas the wherewithal to be the central magnet for such a coalition.An American-Chinese strategic dialogue regarding the areas that both countries desire to see free ofdomination by other aspiring hegemons is therefore imperative.But to make progress, the dialogue should besustained and serious.In the course of such communication, more contentious issues pertaining to Taiwan andeven to human rights could then be addressed more persuasively.Indeed, the point can be made quite crediblythat the issue of China's internal liberalization is not a purely domestic Chinese affair, since only ademocratizing and prosperous China has any prospect of peacefully enticing Taiwan.Any attempt at forciblereunification would not only place the American-Chinese relationship in jeopardy but would inevitablygenerate adverse consequences for China's capacity to attract foreign capital and sustain its development.China's own aspirations to regional preeminence and global status would thereby be victimized.Although China is emerging as a regionally dominant power, it is not likely to become a global one for a longtime to come (for reasons stated in chapter 6) and paranoiac fears of China.as a global power are breedingmegalomania in China, while perhaps also becoming the source of a self-fulfilling prophesy of intensifiedAmerican-Chinese hostility.Accordingly, China should be neither contained nor propitiated.It should betreated with respect as the world's largest developing state, and so far at least a rather successful one.Itsgeopolitical role not only in the Far East but in Eurasia as a whole is likely to grow as well.Hence, it wouldmake sense to coopt China into the G-7 annual summit of the world's leading countries, especially sinceRussia's inclusion has widened the summit's focus from economics to politics.As China becomes more integrated into the world system and hence less able and less inclined to exploit itsregional primacy in a politically obtuse fashion, it also follows that a de facto emergence of a Chinese sphere ofdeference in areas of historic Interest to China is likely to be part of the emerging Kurasian slriiclure ofgeopolitical accommodation.Whether a united Korea will oscillate toward such a sphere depends much on thedegree of Japanese-Korean reconciliation (which America should more actively encourage), but in any case, thereunification of Korea without an accommodation with China is unlikely.A Greater China at some point will inevitably press for a resolution of the issue of Taiwan, but the degree ofChina's inclusion in an increasingly binding set of international economic and political links may also have apositive impact on the nature of Chinese domestic politics.If China's absorption of Hong Kong proves not to berepressive, Deng's formula for Taiwan of "one country, two systems" can become redefined as "one country,several systems." That might make reunification more acceptable to the parties concerned which againreinforces the point that without some political evolution of China itself, a peaceful reconstitution of one Chinawill not be possible.In any case, for historic as well as geopolitical reasons, China should consider America its natural ally [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]