[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.During the 1970s the United States also sensibly collaborated tacitlywith communist China for the limited purpose of constraining the greaterdanger of surging Soviet power.Our mistake lay in thinking this arrange-ment with Chinese dictators could or should be permanent beyond thecollapse of the Soviet Union.33Even in a unipolar world, with conditions more propitious for theUnited States, spreading democracy or choosing a democratic ally is notalways the prudentially available option.Although the United States shouldwelcome the successful national elections in Palestine and Iraq, as well aslocal elections in Saudi Arabia and the end of Syrian rule in Lebanon, sta-ble, liberal democracy has yet to take hold in the Middle East.It will taketime, patience, and the capacity to accept serious reverses along the way forthe United States to succeed in spreading democracy durably rather thanjust contingently.The recent victory of the radical Hamas in the Palestin-ian territories underscores the critical distinction between stable, liberaldemocratic regimes, which are benign, and illiberal democracies, whichare often menacing.In some cases, moreover, the United States will haveto engage with regimes such as Pakistan under Musharraf that fall farshort of our ultimate preferences.The Perils of Neorealism 35Stable, liberal democracy is, however, always the preferred option.Alli-ances with such regimes rest on a far more reliable foundation than tacticalarrangements with dictatorships.Convergences of enlightened self-inter-est among stable, liberal democracies are much more likely to transcendchanges in time and circumstance to become permanent rather than tac-tical interests.In this regard, our burgeoning relationship with democraticIndia should have greater priority than our collaboration with authoritar-ian Pakistan, though the Bush administration wisely sought to retain goodrelations with Pakistan for the larger goal of winning the war on terror.Fareed Zakaria explains why:Most countries have relationships that are almost exclusively be-tween governments.Think of the links between the United Statesand Saudi Arabia, which exist among a few dozen high officials[have] and never really gone beyond that.But sometimes bondsdevelop not merely between states and between societies.Twicebefore the United States had developed a relationship with a coun-try that was strategic, but also with much more with Britain andlater with Israel.In both cases, the resulting ties were broad anddeep, going well beyond governmental officials and diplomaticnegotiations.The two countries knew each other and understoodeach other and as a result became natural and almost permanentpartners.America has the opportunity to forge such a relationshipwith India.That does not mean the United States and Indiawill agree on every policy issue.Remember that even during theirclose wartime alliance, Roosevelt and Churchill disagreed aboutseveral issues, most notably India s independence.America brokewith Britain over Suez.It condemned Israel for its invasion of Leb-anon.Washington and New Delhi have different interests and thuswill inevitably have policy disputes.But it is precisely because ofthe deep bonds between these countries that such disagreementswould not alter the fundamental reality of friendship, empathy,and association.34Third, sustaining and spreading stable, liberal democracy often require animbalance of power heavily favoring the forces of freedom.For instance,the collapse of liberal democracy in Europe during the interwar years oc-36 In Defense of the Bush Doctrinecurred because of an insidious interaction between deteriorating internaland external conditions.America s withdrawal into isolation, Great Brit-ain s indifference, and French weakness conspired to undermine the favor-able security environment on which the survival of fragile democracies inGermany and Eastern Europe largely hinged.The failure to enforce the de-fective but potentially effective Versailles Treaty emboldened German op-ponents of Weimar democracy to overthrow the regime and the treaty.Atthe same time the progressive erosion of French willingness and capabilityto back its allies commitments to Eastern Europe demoralized the demo-crats there and encouraged already powerful antidemocratic forces in theregion.35 In the early 1920s, for example, almost all of Europe s twenty-eightregimes west of the Soviet Union, including those in Eastern Europe, weredemocracies.By the end of 1938 that number had dwindled to twelve, andnone remained in Eastern Europe.By 1941 only five democracies remainedintact.36Conversely, a felicitous interplay between the establishment of stable, lib-eral democracies and the benign effects of American power accounts largelyfor the tremendous success of vigilant containment in Western Europe afterWorld War II [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]