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.Thus there are maxims of speculative reason, which are based solely upon its speculativeinterest, although they appear to be objective principles.When principles which are really regulative are regarded as constitutive, and employed as objectiveprinciples, contradictions must arise; but if they are considered as mere maxims, there is no room forcontradictions of any kind, as they then merely indicate the different interests of reason, which occasiondifferences in the mode of thought.In effect, Reason has only one single interest, and the seemingcontradiction existing between her maxims merely indicates a difference in, and a reciprocal limitation of, themethods by which this interest is satisfied.This reasoner has at heart the interest of diversity- in accordance with the principle of specification; another,the interest of unity- in accordance with the principle of aggregation.Each believes that his judgement restsupon a thorough insight into the subject he is examining, and yet it has been influenced solely by a greater orless degree of adherence to some one of the two principles, neither of which are objective, but originatesolely from the interest of reason, and on this account to be termed maxims rather than principles.When Iobserve intelligent men disputing about the distinctive characteristics of men, animals, or plants, and even ofminerals, those on the one side assuming the existence of certain national characteristics, certainwell-defined and hereditary distinctions of family, race, and so on, while the other side maintain that naturehas endowed all races of men with the same faculties and dispositions, and that all differences are but theresult of external and accidental circumstances- I have only to consider for a moment the real nature of thesubject of discussion, to arrive at the conclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to judge of, and thatthere is little probability of either party being able to speak from a perfect insight into and understanding ofthe nature of the subject itself.Both have, in reality, been struggling for the twofold interest of reason; theone maintaining the one interest, the other the other.But this difference between the maxims of diversity andunity may easily be reconciled and adjusted; although, so long as they are regarded as objective principles,they must occasion not only contradictions and polemic, but place hinderances in the way of the advancementof truth, until some means is discovered of reconciling these conflicting interests, and bringing reason intounion and harmony with itself.The same is the case with the so-called law discovered by Leibnitz, and supported with remarkable ability byBonnet- the law of the continuous gradation of created beings, which is nothing more than an inference fromthe principle of affinity; for observation and study of the order of nature could never present it to the mind asan objective truth.The steps of this ladder, as they appear in experience, are too far apart from each other,and the so-called petty differences between different kinds of animals are in nature commonly so wideseparations that no confidence can be placed in such views (particularly when we reflect on the great varietyof things, and the ease with which we can discover resemblances), and no faith in the laws which are said toexpress the aims and purposes of nature.On the other hand, the method of investigating the order of nature inthe light of this principle, and the maxim which requires us to regard this order- it being still undeterminedhow far it extends- as really existing in nature, is beyond doubt a legitimate and excellent principle ofreason- a principle which extends farther than any experience or observation of ours and which, withoutgiving us any positive knowledge of anything in the region of experience, guides us to the goal of systematicunity.Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason.The ideas of pure reason cannot be, of themselves and in their own nature, dialectical; it is from theirmisemployment alone that fallacies and illusions arise.For they originate in the nature of reason itself, and itis impossible that this supreme tribunal for all the rights and claims of speculation should be itselfundeserving of confidence and promotive of error.It is to be expected, therefore, that these ideas have aSECTION VII.Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative Principles of Reason.219 The Critique of Pure Reasongenuine and legitimate aim.It is true, the mob of sophists raise against reason the cry of inconsistency andcontradiction, and affect to despise the government of that faculty, because they cannot understand itsconstitution, while it is to its beneficial influences alone that they owe the position and the intelligence whichenable them to criticize and to blame its procedure.We cannot employ an a priori conception with certainty, until we have made a transcendental deductiontherefore.The ideas of pure reason do not admit of the same kind of deduction as the categories.But if theyare to possess the least objective validity, and to represent anything but mere creations of thought (entiarationis ratiocinantis), a deduction of them must be possible.This deduction will complete the critical taskimposed upon pure reason; and it is to this part Of our labours that we now proceed.There is a great difference between a thing's being presented to the mind as an object in an absolute sense, ormerely as an ideal object [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]