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.S.military presence in the country.These voices, interlocutors claimed, receive out-sizedattention and have out-sized influence, in the end preventing, for instance, even more robustand open U.S.-Philippine cooperation.Nonetheless, in terms of broader RP strategy, interlocutors noted that the influence of criticsis limited.As one RP commentator put it,  we tried autonomous defense in the 1990s and itfailed, adding that from a purely practical perspective,  we don t want to spend money ondefense.When we consider guns versus butter, we decide it s good to lean on the UnitedStates. Another interlocutor added,  The United States always leaves behind improvedfacilities when there is an exercise.The relationship has practical benefit to us. Developmentof U.S.-Philippine relations thus retains substantial support among many in strategic andpolicy circles so long as the United States keeps a relatively low and modest profile, avoidingactions that garner headlines and thus provide fodder for the media and opposition partypoliticians.U.S.crimes on Philippine soil potentially provide such fodder.Interlocutors claimed that theSubic Bay rape case created a media frenzy and some negative feelings toward the United4 Filipinos Rank High in Supporting the U.S.in World Affairs, According to 18-Nation Survey, mediarelease, Social Weather Stations, June 12, 2007, http://www.sws.org.ph/pr070612.htm.the philippines | 23States, but it did not leave any lasting impact on the relationship or on overall perceptions ofthe United States.Indeed, interlocutors commented that the lack of strong and broad popularreaction against U.S.military presence as a result of the incident suggested remarkableresilience in support of that presence today.Official Philippine interlocutors were clear that the return of permanent basing would not happenand should not be pushed by the United States.While many local elites reportedly are willing toconsider more military access agreements to facilitate U.S.security presence in their parts ofMindanao, anything permanent there or elsewhere in the country is not politically feasibletoday.Some interlocutors contended that a majority of Filipinos would welcome the return ofpermanent basing, but the vocal minority makes such a proposition untenable for theforeseeable future.Interlocutors likewise affirmed that fundamental structural weaknesses in the Philippines hindermore fulsome bilateral cooperation with the United States.Weak national institutionsgovernment agencies, political parties, etc. volatile domestic politics, and ineffectualpersonalized governance style remain a constraint on the ability of the Philippine governmentto serve as a consistently reliable ally and partner.Interlocutors commented that as a resultthe Philippine polity is slow to act, reactive, and highly unpredictable in its near- and long-term policies.U.S.policymakers and operators complain about these and other constraints inU.S.ability to plan, train, and operate with the Philippines and from Philippine soil.Theresult is a bilateral relationship focused largely inward, on RP problems at home, with littlevision beyond its borders.Official and nonofficial interlocutors alike noted with chagrin that Philippine leaders do not thinkor act strategically but tactically, creating further problems for reliable and consistent partnership. We have no strategic vision; we just do things, was how one Filipino commentator put itwith exasperation, echoing the perspective of others.According to interlocutors,counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, for instance, stemmed largely from theBush administration s obsession with it following September 11, 2001, the evident success ofbroader Southeast Asian counterterrorism efforts as the decade progressed, and the resultingcomfort the RP government had in that defining framework over time.An independentassessment by Philippine leaders and elites of foreign policy goals and national strategy doesnot exist, they say, and thus does not drive national action.Likewise, interlocutors downplayed the notion that the Philippines strategically plays a  Chinacard against the United States in a conscious effort to gain leverage on Washington.Whilesome observers did allow that the Philippine government might consider using relations withChina to moderate U.S.behavior should Washington become too overbearing, to date, theyclaimed, the China relationship has been advanced on its own account with littleconsideration of the connection to overall Philippine strategy or relations with the UnitedStates.This includes President Arroyo s trip to China in 2004.24 | u.s.alliances and emerging partnerships in southeast asiaIt was asserted that RP China policy has sought to maintain peaceful relations with the region slargest emerging power, while ensuring Manila maintains a strong (U.S.) hedge in the future.According to interlocutors, the Philippine leadership has sought to base its relationship withChina on practical economic and political considerations, focusing on issues of commoninterest whenever possible rather than areas of divergence.Interlocutors noted that Philippineleaders recognize that Beijing views Manila with suspicion due to reinvigoration of the U.S.-RP military relationship, including reintroduction of U.S.forces on Philippine soil.Philippineleaders have thus often taken action that seeks to ameliorate China s concerns.For its part, interlocutors claimed, China has generally been gracious and generous to thePhilippines during much of the past decade, including on South China Sea issues.5 At the sametime, however, official interlocutors were hardly unconcerned about China s longer-termintentions, including in the South China Sea, given China s growing military capabilities [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]