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.Later in the book the impact and legacy of Donald Rumsfeld s tenure as DefenseSecretary is described and analyzed.The focus of the next chapter is to describeeffective and ineffective individual performance in the civil military nexus and to35 John Lancaster,  Clinton and the Military: Is Gay Policy Just the Opening Skirmish?Washington Post, 1 February 1993, p.A10.36 Richard H.Kohn,  Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil Military Relations, NationalInterest, No.35 (Spring 1994): 3 31.37 In addition to earlier cited works, see also, Eliot Cohen,  Playing Powell Politics,Foreign Affairs, Vol.74, No.6 (November/December 1995): 102 110.38 Among the most prominent of these panels was the Hart-Rudman Commission.Toread more about their findings and recommendations visit the following website: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/ awcgate/nssg/.39 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld once quipped,  The Constitution of the United Statescalls for civilian control of the military, and I m a civilian. Among the Secretary s famous Rumsfeld Rules were the following two: [his primary function was]  to exercise civiliancontrol over the Department for the Commander-in-Chief and the country and  when cuttingstaff at the Pentagon, don t eliminate the think layer that assures civilian control. For moresee http://www.defenselink.mil/news/jan2001 /rumsfeldsrules.pdf (29 January 2001).Excesses and Over-Corrections 27identify role models towards that end.Examining the personal character, professionalpreparation, and contribution of these historical figures (former political appointeesand 4-star generals) as they served in the nexus would help not only future DefenseSecretaries and top-ranking military officers seeking role models for how best toperform their duties, but also future Presidents as they consider who to appoint tothese critical positions.This page intentionally left blankChapter 3The Search for Role ModelsWhat can be learned from history? The obvious answer is a lot, but not always thingsthat are helpful or relevant to current circumstances.1 Moreover, any retrospectiveexamination of previous human events can provide license for just about any set ofreform agenda desired, especially when choosing historical examples selectively.2I am not escaping this trap and seem to be in good company.Even those who warnagainst using history selectively ultimately seem to fall prey to same, even if theydo not immediately recognize it.3 This is not meant to be a condemning statement;pure objectivity is probably not even achievable in the human experience.4 Thepoint is that historians sometimes fight over the use of history itself, accusing oneanother of choosing cases selectively even as they jockey for position in debatesover interpretations, meaning, and policy relevance.Although methodology shouldalways be reviewed and considered, instead of rejecting arguments out of handbased on cases selected, perhaps it is better to recognize that any use of history willbe at least partially subjective, accept it as such, and move on with evaluation of theargument presented in its entirety.51 This is the central point of Richard E.Neustadt and Ernest R.May, Thinking in Time:The Uses of History for Decision-makers (New York: Free Press, 1986).Decisionmakers mustbe careful in their approach to history as picking and employing the wrong analogies can beworse than ignoring history all together.2 Douglas Porch,  Writing History in the  End of History Era  Reflections on Historiansand the GWOT, Journal of Military History, Vol.70 (October 2006): 1065 1080.3 Ibid.See also Eliot Cohen,  The Historical Mind Set and Making Strategy, Orbis,2005.4 While pure objectivity may be elusive, Humans can communicate via language,graphic depiction, and dialogue which can lead to shared understanding and meaning.Thismay not be  objectivity, but it is probably more significant anyhow because when conductedthoughtfully it incorporates the best aspects of introspection (subjectivity), reflection, anddiscourse and is more likely to result in knowledge, that which is the ultimate design ofobjectivity in the first place.5 Cohen s piece,  The Historical Mind and Military Strategy is very impressive.He makes a persuasive case that what is most valuable for aspiring military strategists is todevelop a historical mind, a committed active learning approach based on an extensive read ofvarying accounts across time and culture.Identifying dissimilarities is important as, possiblyeven more important as, finding similarities between current situations and those of the past.In this way one may avoid the trap of false analogies  all sage advice [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]