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.The origin of this atrocity was the desire of Churchill and Roosevelt at Yalta in January to prove to Stalin that they were doing their best to help the Russian effort on the eastern front.The Russians had particularly asked for Dresden, a communications center, to be wiped out.When Harris queried the order, it was confirmed direct from Yalta by Churchill and Air Chief Marshal Portal.Would Churchill have used the atomic bomb against Germany, had it been available in time? Undoubtedly.The British nuclear weapons project had begun seriously in March 1940, before he took over supreme command.But he accelerated it in June, when the Military Application of Uranium Detonation Committee (or Maud, as it was called, whimsically, after a Kentish governess) was joined by the French team, which brought with them the world’s entire stock of heavy water, 185 kilograms in twenty-six canisters.In the autumn of 1940 Churchill sent a team to Washington headed by Sir Henry Tizard and Sir John Cockcroft, Britain’s two leading military scientists, taking with them all Britain’s nuclear secrets in a celebrated “black box.” At that time Britain was ahead of any other nation in the quest for a nuclear bomb, and moving faster.Churchill was asked to authorize production plans for a separation plant by December 1940.In July 1941 he got the Maud Report, “Use of Uranium for a Bomb,” which told him the weapon could be ready by 1943.When America joined the war, Churchill decided that the risk of Nazi raids against a British A-plant was such that it was safer, with the scientific work now complete, for the industrial and engineering work to be done in America.In fact it proved much more difficult, lengthy, and costly than Maud had anticipated.So the first A-bombs were essentially American.If an all-British bomb had been made in time, Churchill would have commanded its use against Germany.Perhaps his greatest contribution to the successful outcome of the war, at this stage, was his insistence on the right timing for Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of northwest Europe.This was necessary for the defeat of Germany, and Churchill made sure it worked and was achieved with minimum loss of life for so immense and hazardous an operation.He argued that an opposed air-sea landing against formidable defenses manned by large, prepared German forces was perhaps the most difficult military undertaking of all.With the costly failure of Gallipoli always in his mind, he insisted that D-day should not take place until overwhelming strength was established and there was a near certitude of success.The Russians had asked for the second front to be opened in 1942.The Americans were willing to risk it in 1943.The “dress rehearsal” at Dieppe in 1942, where Allied losses were unexpectedly high, had shown what hazards lay ahead.Churchill’s conditions could not be met until the early summer of 1944.Even so, Overlord might have failed or proved extremely costly had not a highly successful deception plan persuading the Germans that the Normandy landings were a feint and that the real invasion was planned for the Pas de Calais area—another idea of Churchill’s—prevented a massive German counterattack in the early stages.Thanks to Churchill, and his memories of the Dardanelles, Overlord was a dramatic success.He wished to be present on the first day to enjoy his triumph.It was the last major occasion on which his desire to participate in military action manifested itself.All those concerned in the operation were horrified.Indeed, the desire was foolish in the extreme, a grotesque exhibition of the childish side of his nature.But he persisted, despite unanimous opposition from the service chiefs, the cabinet, his own staff, and the White House.In the end it was only the opposition of King George VI, who said that if his prime minister risked his life he must do so himself, which scotched the plan.The delay occasioned by Churchill’s ensuring the invasion succeeded necessarily meant the Western forces were behind the Russians in pushing into the heart of the Nazi empire.This had grave political consequences.Churchill sought to mitigate them by demanding a full-speed drive to Berlin by the Anglo-American forces.This was supported by Montgomery, the army group commander, who was sure it was possible and would end the war in autumn 1944, with the West in Berlin first.But Eisenhower, the supreme commander, thought it was risky and insisted on a “broad front” advance, which meant that the war continued into the spring of 1945, and that the Russians got to Berlin first—and Prague, Budapest, Vienna, too.In his last weeks of life, FDR, despite Churchill’s pleas, did nothing to encourage Eisenhower to press on rapidly.Montgomery wrote sadly: “The Americans could not understand that it was of little avail to win the war strategically if we lost it politically.” That was exactly Churchill’s view.But if he was unable to stop Stalin from turning much of Eastern Europe and the Balkans into Soviet satellites, he did snatch one brand from the burning—Greece.He used British troops, against much well-meaning advice, to intervene decisively in the civil war raging there between Communist guerrillas and forces loyal to the Crown.The politics were complex and made it difficult to decide whom to back among the contending loyalist leaders.Eventually Churchill decided in favor of the republican, anti-Communist general Nikolaos Plastiras.He joked, “The evidence shows we must back Plaster-arse.Let us hope his feet are not of clay.” “Tommy” Lascelles, King George VI’s secretary, remarked, “I would rather have said that than written Gray’s Elegy.”Churchill also saved Persia by negotiating a highly satisfactory deal with the Russians, which enabled the British eventually to reduce their influence to a minimum.He kept a tight grip on the Persian Gulf and its oil fields.Of course, by saving Greece, he also enabled Turkey to stay beyond the reach of the triumphant Soviet forces.What is more, by picking a first-class general and backing him with adequate forces, Churchill also made a major contribution to victory in the Far East.Field Marshal William Slim was, next to Montgomery, the ablest of the British generals produced by the war.His Fourteenth Army was often called “the Forgotten Army,” in contrast to Montgomery’s famous Eighth Army.But it was not forgotten by Churchill.With his encouragement and support it conducted a hard and skillful campaign in Burma, ending in complete victory, which did a great deal to restore British prestige so cruelly damaged by the Singapore disaster.Indeed within four years Britain was able to get back Singapore, Malaya, and Hong Kong [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]