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.For a standard account of ranking and ordering problems, see Kenneth J.Ar-strong democratic politics.An examination of four of them may helprow, Social Choice and Individual Values, zd ed.(New Haven: Yale University Press,1963).The transitivity problem is sometimes referred to as "Arrow's dilemma," al-clarify the nature of strong democratic citizenship.The four para-though it is in fact as old as the logic of choice and probability theory.doxes are (1) that human preferences are incommensurable yet must49.Typical of the problems that modern social theorists face is John Rawls's at-be articulated, selected, ranked, and thus compared and evaluated; tempt to construct an interpersonal index of goods by which to measure "least ad-vantaged persons"; see his.4 Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University(2) that efforts to make politics more representative only produce aPress, 1971).My objections to his argument and to the general issue of interpersonalfragmented, inefficient system that is increasingly elitist (this is theindices are expressed in my "Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Measure-ment, and Politics in Rawls," American Political Science Review 69, 2 (June 1975).so-called iron law of oligarchy); (3) that voters are equal i n the num-Citizenship and Participation 205The Argument for Citizenship204like steak better than ice cream; I like ice cream better than vodka;mas have been taken up by logicians and statisticians from the timebut I like vodka better than steak" may have a classification ratherof Borda and Condorcet i n the eighteenth century and treated asthan a preference problem.He may mean that he likes steak best asmodels of political choice.The more recent work of Duncan Black,measured by nutrition, ice cream best as measured by taste, andKenneth Arrow, Mancur Olson, Anthony Downs, James Buchanan,vodka best as measured by effect.When asked for a choice, we getWilliam Riker, and many others who are laboring i n the public-the paradox of transitivity; when asked for a clarification, we maychoice field retains the early commitment to "the possibility of form-5 0get information that leads out of the paradox (including, perhaps, aing a pure science of Politics." There is evidence of course thatranking of nutrition, taste, and effect, which would permit us to dis-rational models can correspond to certain forms of social behaviorcover which he would choose and when, since time and circum-and that they help explicate problems of choice i n committees andstances might play a role).elsewhere.This is particularly true for liberal democratic systems,The problem with reducing decision-making to mere voting iswhich have themselves evolved under the influence of theories ofthat information is minimized and the paradoxes of fixed options arerationality.maximized.Talk enables us to examine rank orders, commensurableNevertheless, i n a strong democratic system some of the dilem-scales, and the effect of time and place; it allows us to get at what wemas of rational choice are muted or circumvented.Agendas therereally want as individuals and as a community.Voting freezes usare integral to the process of talk and deliberation, and options areinto rational dilemmas.Those who believe that democracy is a Py-as much created as chosen and are i n any case subjected to the testthagorean puzzle that becomes invalid if it cannot be "solved" byof a single vision of the common future (in which implicit hierarchiesthe theorems of logic and statistics confound problems of numbersof values can be found).Intransitivity is a problem i n liberal democ-and words wi th problems of willing and judgment.It is not just thatracy because it suggests incommensurable preferences.But if valuesjudges and citizens finally have to choose; it is that their choices areand interests are incommensurable it is because they have neithergenerally more coherent and less paradoxical than the logical dilem-been harmonized by an integrated wil l nor put to the test of beingmas extrapolated from them, especially if the choices are informedwilled into a single common world (which, perforce, orders inter-by a process of strong democratic talk.ests and goods i n a natural, existential hierarchy whether we wantit so or not).In other words, intransitivity paradoxes often merely2.The Iron Law of Oligarchy.There has been considerable debate inconceal incoherently conceived options or a subliminal substitutionrecent years about how to make the American system "more rep-of one scale for another wi th respect to choices that would otherwiseresentative." The trouble is that "more representative" can meanbe perfectly coherent and transitive.The gourmand who says, " I"more oligarchic." Exponents of "democratization" argued for and50.This is the claim made by Duncan Black (p.xi).His book, an early work but won reforms i n the Democratic Party's process of selecting presi-one which won the 1983 Lippincott award of the American Political Science Associa-dential candidates that moved the weight of choice from the partytion, is useful because it surveys the history of rational-choice dilemmas starting with5 1convention ("elite") to the primary system.Now the pendulum isBorda and Condorcet in the eighteenth century and because it discusses the abstractdilemmas in the context of the concrete data about choice in committees; see Duncanswinging the other way, but there is little evidence that the reformsBlack, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,of 1968 through 1976 have had any lasting effect on elite/mass poli-1958).Kenneth Arrow's seminal work is cited in note 48 above.Other works, includ-ing studies by authors cited in the text, are: James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, Thetics.The iron law of oligarchy, which claims that when citizens del-Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Anthony Downs,egate power they create the conditions for oligarchy and thereforeAn Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1956); Peter C.Fish-burn, The Theory of Social Choice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Douglas51.For a complete discussion of the democratic reform movement and of partyRae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press,politics in the spirit of the argument offered here, see my "The Undemocratic Party1971): and William H.Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale Uni-System: The Problem of Citizenship in an Elite/Mass Society," in Robert Goldwyn,versity Press, 1963), and his recent Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation betweened., Political Parties in the Eighties (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute^the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: Freeman, 1982).1980).For another recent discussion that reflects the liberal representative position,In this last book Riker suggests that although some critics claim to distinguish thesee Cyrus R.Vance, "Reforming the Electoral System," New York Times Magazine, 22rational models associated with choice theory from the political realities addressedFebruary 1981.by democratic theory, there are crucial issues between these realms [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]