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.Ewell s timidity at pushing onto the heights before him was156 stuart and the defeat at gettysburgat least partly due to his concern over the unknown Union strengththere.As late as the second day of the battle, Lee did not know theprecise lay of the land or what his tactical options were, and he hadto use staff officers for reconnaissance.Lee must have thought wistfully of how different the first day sbattle might have been had Stuart been there to report on theChambersburg road with his usual precise and accurate account ofthe situation confronting the army in Gettysburg.Surely the army(and Lee) did miss Stuart and his cavalry.Seventh, Stuart s raid made him very late on the battlefield atGettysburg and reduced the effectiveness of the cavalry so muchthat it could not make a real contribution to the battle on the thirdday.Stuart s orders that day probably were to press the Union rightflank, so as to draw strength away from the center where Pickettwas attacking, and to be prepared to exploit a Confederate break-through if one occurred.Because he had no time to spare, Stuartfailed to achieve surprise, and his mission was a failure from thestart.The execution was half-hearted and disorganized, and theUnion cavalry did most of the attacking.The whole fight was briefand went almost unnoticed by the Union command.This actionwas perhaps the low point of Stuart s field career.All this said, it is by no means clear that this cavalry action evenhad Stuart vigorously pursued it would have changed the out-come of the battle.But it was not vigorously pursued, and a  whatif must remain.These conclusions seem to emerge from the record.They do notconstitute a moral indictment of Stuart, nor do they in any way tar-nish his many other notable accomplishments as a military leader.But these conclusions cannot be ignored.The record also confirmsLee s ultimate responsibility for the outcome.Lee thought Stuartknew what was expected of him and did not worry over how hewent about it.Had Lee s orders been more precise had he ruledout the route east of the Bull Run Ridge or explicitly stated a dateby which Stuart was to rejoin the army presumably either Stuartstuart and the defeat at gettysburg 157would have given up his raid and followed them or else Lee, afterthe battle, would have reluctantly agreed with Marshall that Stuarthad to be formally disciplined.As it was, Lee could not honestly saythat Stuart violated his orders or consider any formal reprimand.Stuart undertook a bold, risky adventure that contributed noth-ing to Lee s objectives in the campaign, but it did seem to be withinthe discretion granted him.Lee had misjudged one of his favoritelieutenants.No doubt Lee shook his head in disappointment andpuzzlement.All he could do later was to state the blunt truth thatmatters might have turned out better had Stuart been where he wassupposed to be.It seems hard to quarrel with this conclusion.The Judgment of Others on GettysburgProbably everyone who has ever thought for a moment about Get-tysburg has an opinion about why Lee lost.Douglas Southall Free-man devoted a long annex to the question in his magisterial biogra-phy of Lee and concluded that five factors contributed to the defeat;but Stuart s absence headed the list.1Many former Confederates had their own opinions, and nearlyall published them.Among the most interesting were those in aspecial issue of the Southern Historical Society Papers in 1877 devotedto  the cause of Lee s defeat at Gettysburg, with contributions bymany who actually participated in the battle. There does seem tohave emerged a consensus, from different ranks and different ele-ments of the army, about the importance of the absence of Stuartand the cavalry.Tom Rosser, himself a cavalryman, wrote,  Stuartwas a cavalry general of great ability, and of exceptional enterprise,courage and energy.[but] he was like all other men, human andliable to err, and did, in my opinion on this campaign, undoubtedly,make the fatal blunder which lost us the battle of Gettysburg. 2Harry Heth agreed strongly with this judgment:  The failure tocrush the Federal army in Pennsylvania in 1863, in the opinion ofalmost all the officers of the Army of Northern Virginia, can beexpressed in five words the absence of our cavalry. 3158 stuart and the defeat at gettysburgFitzhugh Lee listed three factors that contributed to the defeat:the absence of the cavalry; the failure to press the attack on the firstday; and Longstreet s delay in reaching his position and launch-ing his attack on the second day [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]