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.It is unnecessary to observe that this account of virtue corresponds too pretty"See Aristotle Ethic.Nic.l.2.c.5.et seq.et l.3.c.5.et seq.VII.ii.1 247The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smithexactly with what has been said above concerning the propriety and improprietyof conduct.According to Aristotle", indeed, virtue did not so much consist in those mod-13erate and right affections, as in the habit of this moderation.In order to understandthis, it is to be observed, that virtue may be considered either as the quality of anaction, or as the quality of a person.Considered as the quality of an action, itconsists, even according to Aristotle, in the reasonable moderation of the affec-tion from which the action proceeds, whether this disposition be habitual to theperson or not.Considered as the quality of a person, it consists in the habit of thisreasonable moderation, in its having become the customary and usual dispositionof the mind.Thus the action which proceeds from an occasional fit of generosityis undoubtedly a generous action, but the man who performs it, is not necessar-ily a generous person, because it may be the single action of the kind which heever performed.The motive and disposition of heart, from which this action wasperformed, may have been quite just and proper: but as this happy mood seemsto have been the effect rather of accidental humour than of any thing steady orpermanent in the character, it can reflect no great honour on the performer.Whenwe denominate a character generous or charitable, or virtuous in any respect, wemean to signify that the disposition expressed by each of those appellations is theusual and customary disposition of the person.But single actions of any kind,how proper and suitable soever, are of little consequence to show that this is thecase.If a single action was sufficient to stamp the character of any virtue upon theperson who performed it, the most worthless of mankind might lay claim to allthe virtues; since there is no man who has not, upon some occasions, acted withprudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude.But though single actions, how laud-able soever, reflect very little praise upon the person who performs them, a singlevicious action performed by one whose conduct is usually very regular, greatlydiminishes and sometimes destroys altogether our opinion of his virtue.A singleaction of this kind sufficiently shows that his habits are not perfect, and that he isless to be depended upon, than, from the usual train of his behaviour, we mighthave been apt to imagine.Aristotle too , when he made virtue to consist in practical habits, had it prob-14ably in his view to oppose the doctrine of Plato, who seems to have been of opin-ion that just sentiments and reasonable judgments concerning what was fit to bedone or to be avoided, were alone sufficient to constitute the most perfect virtue."See Aristotle Ethic.Nic.lib.ii.ch.1, 2, 3, and 4.See Aristotle Mag.Mor.lib.ch.I.VII.ii.1 248The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam SmithVirtue, according to Plato, might be considered as a species of science, and noman, he thought, could see clearly and demonstratively what was right and whatwas wrong, and not act accordingly.Passion might make us act contrary to doubt-ful and uncertain opinions, not to plain and evident judgments.Aristotle, on thecontrary, was of opinion, that no conviction of the understanding was capable ofgetting the better of inveterate habits, and that good morals arose not from knowl-edge but from action.III.According to Zeno", the founder of the Stoical doctrine, every animal was15by nature recommended to its own care, and was endowed with the principle ofself-love, that it might endeavour to preserve, not only its existence, but all thedifferent parts of its nature, in the best and most perfect state of which they werecapable.The self-love of man embraced, if I may say so, his body and all its differ-16ent members, his mind and all its different faculties and powers, and desired thepreservation and maintenance of them all in their best and most perfect condi-tion.Whatever tended to support this state of existence was, therefore, by naturepointed out to him as fit to be chosen; and whatever tended to destroy it, as fit tobe rejected [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]